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 Blind signature allows a user to obtain a signature on a message without 
revealing anything about the message to the signer. Blind signatures play an 
important role in many real world applications such as e-voting, e-cash 
system where anonymity is of great concern. Due to the rapid growth in 
popularity of both wireless communications and mobile devices, the design 
of secure schemes with low-bandwidth capability is an important research 
issue. In this paper, we present a new blind signature scheme with message 
recovery in the ID-based setting using bilinear pairings over elliptic curves. 
The proposed scheme is unforgeable with the assumption that the 
Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. We compare our scheme 
with the related schemes in terms of computational and communicational 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 A digital signature scheme with message recovery is a signature scheme in which the original 
message of the signature is not required to be transmitted together with the signature since it has been 
appended to the signature and can be recovered according to the verification/message recovery process. It is 
different to an authenticated encryption scheme or signcryption scheme, since in this scheme, the embedded 
message can be recovered by anyone without the secret information. The purpose of this kind of signatures is 
to minimize the total length of the original message and the appended signature. So, these are useful in any 
organization where bandwidth is one of the main concern or for the application in which small message 
should be signed. 
Blind signature scheme was introduced by Chaum [1] in 1982 to provide the anonymity of the user 
and plays a central role in cryptographic protocols such as e-voting, e-payment[2], [3]. Such a signature 
allows a user to obtain a signature of a message in a way that the signer learns neither the message nor the 
resulting signature. The scheme can ensure untraceability and unlinkability.  
With the advantages of ID-based cryptography, several ID-based signature schemes and and their 
variants have been proposed in the literature [2]-[4]. The first ID-based blind signature scheme was proposed 
by Zhang and Kim [5] in Asiacrypt 2002. Later, in 2003, Zhang and Kim [6] proposed a new ID-based blind 
signature scheme based on bilinear pairings. In 2005, Huang et al. [7] proposed ID-based blind signature 
schemes using bilinear pairings and showed that the schemes are not secure if the ROS problem is solvable. 
In 2006, Zhao et al. [8] presented another blind signature scheme is efficient than Zhang and Kim's  
schemes [5], [6]. A generalized ID-based blind signature from bilinear pairings was proposed in 2007 by 
Kalkan et al. [9]. An ID-based authenticated blind signature scheme from bilinear pairings was proposed by 
Zhao et al. in 2007 [10]. In 2010, B.U. Rao et al. [11] proposed ID-based blind signature schemes from 
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bilinear pairings and is efficient than the previous ID-based blind signature shames. In 2013 Xu et al. [12] 
proposed and ID-based blind signature scheme with unlinkability. In 2014, Pance et al. [13] proposed a 
comparison of ID-based blind signatures from pairings for e-voting protocols. 
A blind signature with message recovery is important in communication which requires the smaller 
bandwidth for signed messages than signatures without message-recovery. In 2005, Han et al. [14] proposed 
a pairing-based blind signature scheme with message recovery based on modified Weil/ Tate pairings over 
elliptic curves. This scheme needs smaller bandwidth and improves the communication efficiency than other 
previous ID-based blind signatures. Also this scheme provides high security with smaller keys in size.  In 
2009, Wang et al. [15] proposed optimal blind signature padding with message recovery. This scheme uses 
an ideal cipher with a smaller block size to design a secure two-move blind signature with an optimal 
padding. Their scheme has the message recovery property with less bandwidth.  Zhang et al. [16] proposed a 
kind of message-recoverable fairness blind digital signature scheme in 2011.  ID-based blind signature 
schemes with message recovery schemes are also proposed [17]-[19]. In 2005, Han et al. [13] proposed a 
pairing-based blind signature with message recovery.  In 2006, Hassan et al. [17] proposed a new blind ID-
based signature scheme with message recovery which improves the computational efficiency in the Han et al. 
scheme [14]. It achieves bandwidth savings and is suitable for signing short messages.  
In this paper, by considering the above advantages, we designed a new blind signature scheme with 
message recovery in the identity-based setting. The proposed IBBSSMR scheme is based on the bilinear 
pairings over elliptic curves and is designed for the messages of fixed length. The scheme is useful where the 
anonymity of the users and bandwidth constraints are of great concern. The proposed scheme is unforgeable 
with the assumption that the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, mathematical preliminaries are provided. 
Section 3 presents the syntax and security model of the proposed IBBSSMR scheme. In Section 4, an 
identity-based blind signature scheme with message recovery is proposed. In Section 5,  the  proof  of  
correctness,  security analysis and the efficiency analysis  of  the  proposed  scheme are presented.  Finally, 




In this section, we will briefly discuss the basic concepts on bilinear pairings and related 
computational hard problems. 
 
2.1.  Bilinear Pairings 
It is an important cryptographic primitive and is widely adopted in many positive applications of 
cryptography. Let  1,G   and  2 ,  .G  be two cyclic groups of same prime order q. Let P be a generator of 
1.G  A bilinear pairing is a map eˆ  defined by  1 1 2ˆ :e G G G   satisfying the following properties: 
1. Bilinearity: For all 1,  P Q G  and 
*,  ,qa b Z  ˆ ˆ( ,  ) ( ,  ) .
abe aP bQ e P Q   
2. Non-Degeneracy: There exists 1P G  such that ˆ( ,  ) 1.e P P   
3. Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute ˆ( ,  )e P Q  for all 1,  .P Q G  
Such a pairing eˆ  is called an admissible pairing and can be constructed by the modified Weil or Tate 
pairings on elliptic curves defined over a finite field. 
 
2.2.   Bilinear Pairings over Elliptic Curves 
The  modified  Weil  pairing  and  Tate  pairing  are  admissible  instantiations  of  bilinear  pairings. 
The modified Weil pairing settings are briefly discussed. Let  p   be a sufficiently large prime such that 
2 mod 3p    and 1p lq  , where  q  is also a large prime. Let  E  be an elliptic curve defined by   the 
equation  
2 3 1y x    over pF . Define   ( )pE F   to  be  the  group  of  points  on  E   over  pF . Let  
 ( )pP E F   be  a  point  of  order  q  and  1G   be  the  subgroup  of  points  generated  by  .P  Let  2G   be  
the  subgroup  of  2
*
p
F   of  order  q . The  modified  Weil  pairing  is  thus  defined  by  1 1 2ˆ : e G G G    
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2.3.   Map-to-Point  Hash  function  
Consider  a  hash  function   * *1 1: 0,1 .H G  It  is  sufficient  to  have  a  hash  function  
 *1 : 0,1H A   for  some  set  A   and  an  encoding  function  
*
1:L A G .  The encoding function L  is  
called  Map-to-Point. Again, let  p  be a prime satisfying 2mod 3  and  1p p lq   , where  q   is also 
prime. Let E  be the elliptic curve defined by the equation 2 3 1y x   over pF . 
 Let  1G  be the subgroup of points on  E  of order q . Suppose we already have a hash function
 *1 : 0,1 pH F .  A Map-to-Point algorithm works as follows on input 0 py F . 
1. Compute    
1 (2 1)/3
2 23
0 0 01 1
p
px y y F

     . 
2. Let   0 0, ( )pQ x y E F    and set  1IDQ lQ G  . 
3. Output Map-to-Point  0( ) IDy Q . 
 
2.4.    Computational Problems 
This section presents some  computational  problems  which  will  form  the  basis  of  security  for  
our  IBBSSMR scheme. 
1. Discrete  Logarithm  Problem (DLP): Given  two  group  elements    and  P Q , find  an  integer  n   
such  that  Q nP   whenever  such  an  integer  exists. 
2. Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP): For 
*, ,  R qa b c Z ,  given  , , ,P aP bP cP decide  
whether  modc ab q . 
3. Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP): For
*,  R qa b Z , given  , ,P aP bP   compute abP . 
Throughout this paper, we assume that CDHP and DLP are intractable.  
 
 
3. SYNTAX AND SECURITY OF THE PROPOSED IBBSSMR SCHEME 
In this section we present the syntax and security model of the proposed IBBSSMR scheme. 
 
3.1.   Syntax of IBBSSMR 
Our blind signature scheme with message recovery is an extension of ordinary blind signature 
scheme. This scheme consists of the following four algorithms: System Setup, Key Extract, Blind Signature 
Generation, Blind Signature Verification with Message Recovery.  The detailed description of these 
algorithms is described.   
1. System Setup: For a given security parameter ,k Z

 
the Key Generation Centre (KGC) run this 
algorithm and generates the system parameters Params and the master key s. Params are made 
public and s is kept secret. Params are implicit input to all the following algorithms. 
2. Key Extract:  For a given user’s identity ID, the KGC runs this algorithm to generate the public key 
IDQ  and the private key .IDd  KGC sends IDd  to the corresponding user through a secure channel. 
3. Blind Signature Generation: This is an interactive and probabilistic polynomial time protocol, which 
is operated by the user and the signer. The user first blinds the message M  and obtains a new 
version h  of ,M  and then sends it to the signer. The signer uses his/her private key to sign on h  
and obtains ,V  and then sends it to the user. The user unblinds it to obtain ,V  which is a blind 
signature on the original .M  
4. Blind Signature Verification with Message Recovery: For a signer’s identity ID and a blind 
signature ,  a verifier runs this algorithm to recover the message and check the validity of the blind 
signature ,  more precisely, the algorithm Verify ( ,  )ID    outputs 1 if accepted, or 0 if rejected. 
 
3.2.   Security Requirements of the Proposed IBBSSMR 
A secure blind signature scheme must satisfy the following requirements: 
1. Correctness: If  the  user  and  the  signer, both  comply  with the algorithm  of  blind  signature  
generation, then  the  blind  signature  V  will  always  be  accepted. The  correctness  of  the  
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signature  of  a  message  signed  through  the  signature  scheme  can  be  checked  by  anyone  
using  the  signer’s  public  key. 
2. Blindness : A  signature  is  said  to  be  blind  if  a  given  message-signature  pair  and  the  signer’s  
view  are  statistically  independent. While  correctly  operating  one  instance  of  the  blind  
signature  scheme, let  the  output  be  ( ,  )M V  (i.e, message-signature  pair)  and  the  view  of the  
protocol  .V   At  a  later  time, the  signer  is  not  able  to  link  V   to  ( ,  ).M V The  content  of  the  
message  should  be  blind  to  the  signer; the  signer  of  the  blind  signature  does  not  see  the  
content  of  the  message. 
3. Unforgeability : It  is  with  respect  to  the  user  especially, i.e. the  user  is  not  able  to  forge  
blind  signatures  which  are  accepted  by  the  algorithm  of  verification  of  blind  signatures. Only  
the  signer  can  give  a  valid  signature  for  the  associated  message. 
 
 
4. PROPOSED ID-BASED BLIND SIGNATURE SCHEME WITH MESSAGE RECOVERY  
In  this  section,  we  present  our  ID-based  blind  signature  scheme  with  message  recovery 
(IBBBSSMR) scheme. As discussed in Section 3.1, the detailed functionalities of these algorithms are 
presented. 
1. System Setup: For a given security parameter ,k Z
  the KGC runs this algorithm as follows. Chooses 
two groups  1 2,  G G   of same prime order 2
kq   with a bilinear pairing 1 1 2 1ˆ : ;  e G G G G    is an 
additive cyclic group with 1P G  as a generator and 2G  is a multiplicative cyclic group.  
a. Selects 
*
qs Z  randomly and computes the system public key .pubP sP   
b. Chooses a map-to-point hash function *1 1:{0,  1}H G  and three cryptographic hash functions 
1 2*
2 2:{0,  1}  {0,  1} ,
l l
H G
     1 2 2 11 2 :{0,  1} {0,  1} ,  :{0,  1} {0,  1} .
l l l l
F F   
c. Now KGC publishes the system parameters as 1 2 1 2 1 2ˆ{ ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  }pubParams G G e q P P H H F F  
as public and keeps the master key s   as secret. 
2. Key Extract : Given  an  user’s  identity  ID, the  KGC  computes  the  corresponding  private  key  
ID IDd sQ  where  1( )IDQ H ID  is  the  public  key  of  the  user  and  then  sends  it  to  the 
corresponding user ID  through  a  secure  channel. 
3. Blind Signature Generation : In order  to  sign  a  message  1{0,  1}
l
M   blindly  by  a  signer, whose  
identity  is  ID; the  user  and  the  signer  should  run  the  blind  signature  protocol. 
 [Blind Signature Issuing Protocol] 
 Suppose that  M  is the message to be signed. The blind signature protocol is shown in Figure 1. 
a. The  signer  randomly   chooses  a  number  
* ,qr Z   computes  IDX rd   and  sends  X   to  the  
user  as  a  commitment. 
b. (Blinding) The user randomly chooses  
*,   qa b Z   as blinding factors. The  user  computes   
ˆ ( ,  ).pubU e aP bX P   
2 1 2 1( ,  ),  ( )  ( ( ( )) ).H ID U F M F F M M     
10[ ]h    . 
1 mod  h b h q and sends  h   to  the  signer. 
c. (Signing) The signer sends back IDV X hd  . 
d. (Unblinding) The  user  computes  .pubV bV aP    







User                                    Signer                         
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*
R qr Z  
                                                                        Compute  IDX rd  
           
                       X
        
 
*,  R qa b Z     
Compute ˆ ( ,  )pubU e aP bX P   
2 ( ,  )H ID U   
1 2 1( )  ( ( ( )) )F M F F M M    
10[ ]h      
1 modh b h q  
            
                          h
  
                              Compute  IDV X hd   
            
                         V
  
Compute  pubV bV aP   
 
Figure 1.  The blind signature issuing protocol 
 
 
4. Blind Signature Verification : Given  ID  and  the  signature  ( ,  )h V , any  one can verify the signature 
and recover the message  as  follows: 
a. Compute  2 ˆ ˆ,  ( ,  ) ( ,  ) .pub IDH ID e P V e P hQ    
b. Compute 2[ ]h    . 
c. Recover the message as
1 2
2 ( )l lh F 
   . 
d. Accept  ( ,  )h V   as  a  valid  signature  on  the  message  ( )h M  if  and  only  if  
2




5. ANALYSIS  OF  THE  PROPOSED  IBBSSMR 
In  this  section,  we  present  the  proof  of  correctness,  security and efficiency analysis  of  the  
proposed  IBBSSMR scheme. 
 
5.1. Proof of Correctness  
The following equations give the correctness of the proposed scheme. 
Consider   
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ,  )  ( ,  )  =  ( ,  )  ( , ) 
ˆ ˆ ˆ                                           ( ,  )  ( ,  )  ( , ) 
ˆ                                           ( ,  
pub ID pub pub ID
pub pub ID
e P V e P hQ e P bV aP e P hQ




 ˆ ˆ( ))  ( ,  )  ( , )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ                                          =   ( ,  )  ( ,  )  ( ,  )  ( , )
ˆ                                           ( ,  
ID pub pub ID
ID pub pub ID
pub
X hd e P aP e P hQ
e P bX e P bhd e P aP e P hQ
e P aP bX
 

  ˆ ˆ)  ( ,  )  ( , ) 
ˆ ˆ ˆ                                           ( ,  )  ( ,  )  ( , )
ˆ                                           ( ,  )  
            
pub ID pub ID
pub pub ID pub ID
pub
e P hQ e P hQ
e P aP bX e P hQ e P hQ








5.2. Security Analysis  
In the following, we will show that proposed IBBSSMR satisfies all the security requirements stated 
in section 3.2. 
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5.2.1.  Blindness Property  
 In order  to  prove the blindness property,  we  will  show  that  for  a  given  message-signature  pair  
( ,  ,  )M h V   and  the  signer’s view  ( ,  ,  )M h V , there  always  exists  a  unique  pair  of  blinding  factors  
,  a b   that  maps  ( ,  ,  )M h V   to  ( ,  ,  )M h V . Since  the  user  chooses  the  blinding  factors  ,  a b   
randomly,  the  signer  cannot  get  any  information  from  his/her  view  and  the  signature  scheme  will  be  
blind. For a signature ( ,  )h V  generated on a message M , during the protocol, the following equations must 
hold. 
 
ˆ ( ,  )pubU e aP bX P                                             (1) 
 
1 modh b h q                                     (2) 
 
pubV bV aP                                     (3) 
 
Implies  
1 modb hh q and 
 
  log ( )mod .Ppub
a V bV q   
 The  above  formula,  for  a   involves  the  elliptic  curve  discrete  logarithm  of  1( ) V bV G    
with  respect  to  the  base  pubP . So we can use  pubaP   in the rest of the proof instead. It is obvious that  
*,  qa b Z   exists uniquely from (2)  and  (3) . Next we show that such  
*,  qa b Z   satisfies Equation (1) also. 
 Obviously, due to the non-degenerate property of the bilinear pairings, we have   
     ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,    ,    ( ,  ),  .pub pub pub pubU e aP bX P e U P e e aP bX P P    
 
So we only need to show that 




    
  
  
   
  
  
    
    
 
1
ˆ ˆ ,  ,  
ˆ ˆ  ,  ,  
ˆ ˆ   ,  ,
ˆ ˆ   ,  ,  
ˆ ˆ  ,  ,  
ˆ ˆ ˆ   ,   ,  ,  
ˆ ˆ ˆ  ,    ,  ,  









e e aP bX P P
e e V bV bX P P
e e V b X hd bX P P
e e V bhd P P
e e V hh hd P P
e e V P e hd P P













Thus, the unique solutions of Equations (2) and (3) satisfy Equation (1). Since  the  blinding  factors  are  
unique  and  randomly  chosen  during  the  protocol,  hence the  blindness  property  of  the  proposed  
scheme  follows. 
 
5.2.2.  Unforgeability  
 In order  to  prove  unforgeability,  we  first  assume  that  there  exists  a  probabilistic  polynomial  
time  algorithm A , which  can  create  forged  signatures  of  the  signer. We can then use A  to solve the 
CDH (Computational Diffie-Hellman) problem. Assume  that A  is  able  to  forge  valid blind  signatures  
which  can  be  accepted  by the  verification  algorithm  with  non-negligible  probability. By  the  Oracle  
replay  attack and  the  Forking  Lemma [18], assume A   has  constructed  two  different  valid  blind  
signatures  for  a  message  M .  
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   1 1 1 2 2 2( ,  )   and  ( ,  )h V h V    
 
Since  these  two  valid  blind  signatures  obtained  from the same  random  tape with  different  
oracles 1h and 2.h  It  is  admissible  to  assume  that 
 
    1 1 IDV X h d    and  2 2 IDV X h d      where  1 2.h h  
 
Thus, we have 1 2 2 1( ) ( ) IDV V h h d    and we can compute IDd  as follows  
1
2 1 1 2( )   ( ).IDd h h V V
    
By  the  system  initialization  algorithm  of  the  blind  signature, we  are  able  to  solve  an  instance  of  the  
CDH  problem, namely given  ( ,  ,  )ID pubP Q aP P sP  , it  is  possible  to  compute  ID IDd sQ saP  ,  
which  is  a  contradiction, which  arises  due  to  the  assumption  that  A   successfully  constructed  two  
different  valid  blind  signatures  for  M . Hence the blind signature is unforgeable. 
 
5.3.  Efficiency of the Proposed IBBSSMR 
In this section, we analyze the performance of our IBBSSMR scheme and then we compare it with 
the related schemes in terms of computational and communicational (signature length) cost point of view.  
From the experimental results [19]-[21], to achieve the comparable security with 1024-bit RSA key where 
the bilinear pairing (Tate pairing) is defined over the supersingular elliptic curve 
2 3/ :pE F y x x   with 
embedding degree 2 and the 160-bit Solinas prime number 
159 172 2 1q     with 512-bit prime number p 
satisfying 1 12 .p qr   In addition, we consider the running time calculated for different cryptographic 
operations in Cao et al. [19], He et al. [20], Ren et al. [21] using MIRACL [22], a standard cryptographic 
library and implemented on a hardware platform PIV (Pentium-4) 3GHZ processor with 512-MB memory 
and a windows XP operating system. 
Furthermore, Chung et al. (2007) [23], indicate that the time needed to execute the elliptic curve 
scalar multiplication ( )EMT  is approximately 29 ,MLT   and the time needed to execute the modular 
exponentiation ( )EXT  is approximately  240 .MLT  It was also mentioned in Cao et al. [19] and He et al. [20] 
that the time needed to execute one pairing based scalar multiplication ( )EMT  is approximately 6.38 ,ms i.e 
6.38 ,EMT ms  the time needed to execute one bilinear pairing (Tate pairing) operation  ( )BPT  is 
approximately 20.01ms  i.e. 20.01BPT ms  and the time needed to execute one pairing-based exponentiation 
PXT  is approximately 11.20ms  i.e. 11.20 .PXT ms Now from the works proposed in Baretto et al. 2004 
[24] and Tan et al.  2010 [25], 1 3BP EMT T  and  1 (1/ 2) .PX BPT T  We summarize these computational 
results in Table 1. 
 
 





 Time  needed  to  execute  the  modular  multiplication   operation 
EMT  
 Time  needed  to  execute  the  elliptic  curve  point multiplication                       
(Scalar  multiplication  in  1G ) : 29EM MLT T  
BPT  Time  needed  to  execute  the  bilinear  pairing  operation  in  2G : 87BP MLT T  
PXT  Time needed to execute the pairing-based exponentiation operation  in  2G :  
43.5PX MLT T          
 
EXT      
 Time  needed  to  execute  modular  exponentiation  operation in                                           
* :qZ    240EX MLT T     
INT  
 Time  needed  to  execute  modular  inversion  operation  in                 
 
* :qZ    11.6IN MLT T     
MTPT  
Time  needed  to  execute  a  map-to-point (hash function): 




 Time   needed to execute addition of 2 elliptic curve points.   
(point  addition  in  1G ):  0.12PA MLT T  
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We analyze the efficiency of our proposed IBBSSMR scheme by comparing it with the existing 
schemes [14], [17]. The comparison is summarized in Table 2. 
        
 












From Table 2, it is clear that the signature length of the proposed IBBSSMR scheme is 1( ),q G  which is 
less than Han et al. [14] scheme and equal length with Hassan et al. scheme [17]. Also, the computational 
cost for signing and verification of the proposed IBBSSMR scheme is 475.84  MLT which is less than  
Han et al. [14] and Hassan et al. [17] schemes; and so our scheme is computationally more efficient than the 
Han et al. [14] and Hassan et al. [17] schemes.  Hence, from the above discussion, the proposed IBBSSMR 




In this paper, we proposed a new blind signature scheme with message recovery in the ID-based setting 
using bilinear pairings over elliptic curves. This scheme combines the advantages of blind signature, message 
recovery with ID-based cryptography and plays an important role in cryptographic protocols such as e-voting 
and e-payment. The Blindness property of our scheme provides the anonymity of the user and message 
recovery property provides to work with low band width devices like PDAs, mobile devices etc. Also the 
proposed scheme is secure with the assumption that the CDH problem is intractable. Efficiency analysis of 
our scheme with other schemes shows that the proposed IBBSSMR is efficient in terms of computational and 
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